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Abstract
The rapid proliferation of decentralized marketplace applications
demands scaling solutions beyond state channels in order to facili-
tate high transaction volumes. In this work, we propose PayPlace,
a scalable sidechain mechanism that supports large numbers of
marketplace-style payment transactions off-chain without mandat-
ing an increase in computational or monetary costs of the on-chain
activity required for securing the off-chain transactions. Using
PayPlace, consumers each establish a unidirectional payment chan-
nel with the marketplace operator to pay for their transactions.
However, unlike traditional state channels where funds received
off-chain are locked in the channel until the recipient withdraws
them on the root chain, the PayPlace operator can reference funds
accrued in these channels to in-turn make tamper-proof off-chain
payments to service providers. We construct a novel on-chain nota-
rization and fund withdrawal process that requires providers’ (BLS)
signatures on submitted summaries of off-chain activity. However,
our design also negates any externalities that providers may have on
one another ; i.e. providers withholding signatures have no impact on
the rest. PayPlace provably mitigates well-known attacks and draw-
backs in previous sidechain designs and ensures that consumers
and providers are guaranteed safety of their sidechain funds with-
out the typical requirement of having to be online. We show that
the computational load of PayPlace is typically orders of magnitude
lower than the state-of-the-art scaling solution (Zero-Knowledge
Rollup) for two-sided marketplaces.
1 Introduction
Blockchains generally exhibit limited transaction throughput, long
wait times for transaction finality (block confirmations can take
minutes to hours) and high transaction fees that may even exceed
the transaction value[45]. But facilitating fast and cheap payments,
as are possible with centralized payment systems, is important for
several decentralized applications such as emerging blockchain-
based marketplaces. For instance, several blockchain networks aim
to facilitate sharing of last-mile network resources like bandwidth
and compute, e.g., to create a decentralized wireless service provider
for IoT devices [35, 40, 43]. In such networks, consumers connect
with different providers based on factors like location, making in-
cremental payments for incremental resource consumption (e.g.
frequent “micropayments”). There is also increasing interest in
replicating well-established marketplaces like Amazon and Uber
on distributed ledger technologies (DLT) [2, 9], which would mini-
mize participants’ required trust in the marketplace operator (e.g.,
Amazon or Uber) as their transactions are then executed by decen-
tralized miners and secured by rules enforced via smart-contracts.
For instance, the contract may enforce negotiated limits on the
operator’s commission per order, or ensure that a digital resource
is assigned to the consumer before releasing payment. Realizing
such high-volume decentralized marketplaces requires the ability
to make fast, cheap payments of arbitrary amounts.
While prior works have proposed off-chain payment channels
(also called state channels) to overcome blockchain-imposed per-
transaction costs, this model is optimized for frequent pair-wise in-
teractions between two entities. Consumers would have to establish
dedicated payment channels with each provider they transact with,
and also lock up sufficient funds in each of these channels ahead
of time for subsequent use in making payments to that provider,
imposing prohibitive capital requirements on the consumer who
may interact with various such providers arbitrarily. Further, it is
desirable to facilitate other flexible payment models. Certain mar-
ketplaces may match consumers with providers asynchronously,
e.g., Amazon may decide which of multiple providers should ful-
fil an order well after the consumer has placed and paid for it.
Consumers may even make up-front payments unconnected to
specific transactions that are then fulfilled by multiple providers
over time (e.g., monthly flat-rate mobile data plans). To the best
of our knowledge, no prior work has yet tackled the challenges
in facilitating such cryptocurrency payment transactions in large
marketplaces. On the other hand, several proposals [25, 33, 40, 46]
have presumed the existence of such a mechanism to design sophis-
ticated blockchain-federated marketplaces, e.g. for crowdsensing.
In this work, we develop PayPlace, a system for enabling
flexible payment schemes in blockchain marketplaces that
supports payment transactions for arbitrary amounts at scale.
PayPlace is based on the insight that off-chain payments from con-
sumers to providers in two-sided marketplaces can be decomposed
into consumer-operator and operator-provider transactions. Tradi-
tional payment channels could be used to facilitate these. However,
the funds from off-chain payments made by consumers would be
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locked in their pairwise payment channels with the operator and
unavailable for the operator to reuse unless it triggers a transaction
on the root chain (i.e., the blockchain) to transfer the funds to its
blockchain address. Hence, this would require the operator to use
its own capital and commit sufficient funds in each channel with a
provider for use in relaying payments as soon as the provider fulfils
an order, creating a prohibitively high liquidity requirement. On the
other hand, periodically transferring payments from consumers to
the operator’s address to subsequently make payments to appropri-
ate providers requires making up to nc +np root chain transactions
on the blockchain during every interval, where nc is the number
of consumers and np the number of providers in the marketplace.
This results in high costs especially as the marketplace grows.
With PayPlace, the operator instead pays service providers by
running a sidechain while consumers and the operator transact
at near-zero marginal cost via a modified payment channel con-
struction. Our design allows the operator to leverage a single pool
of liquidity sourced from the pairwise channels established with
consumers to make payments to corresponding providers in the
sidechain. Sidechains [41] are typically centralized services or small
application-specific blockchains with few miners (offering fast fi-
nality and low costs) that run outside the main blockchain. Using
sidechains, promises of cryptocurrency payments can be exchanged
quickly and at low cost between any two participants, while a smart-
contract on the root chain is used to periodically save summaries
of sidechain activity (i.e., the payment promises exchanged) on the
blockchain. Rules encoded in the contract would ideally validate the
submitted sidechain transactions, secure users’ resulting balances,
and allow users who received funds in the sidechain to withdraw
them by directly making calls to the contract on the root chain.
Sidechains are challenging to realize in practice due to the re-
source requirements they impose on the root chain. Storage is
expensive in blockchains since the stored state in a smart-contract
takes up permanent disk space in mining nodes once it is mined into
a block [48]. Prolonged computations on the root chain can become
prohibitively expensive as well, especially since blockchains like
Ethereum dynamically price computation resources [47]. Hence, pe-
riodically having a smart-contract on the root chain verify and store
extensive histories of sidechain transaction activity, as would intu-
itively be needed to protect users from operator- and counter-user
malfeasance, may be prohibitively expensive.
Minimum Viable Plasma (MVP) [12, 13, 41] addresses these re-
source challenges by requiring only short hashes (called commit-
ments) of sidechain activity to be published to the smart-contract,
significantly reducing storage requirements. However, MVP is vul-
nerable to the data availability attack [14], wherein the operator
does not reveal to the users the transaction history from which this
commitment was generated. Users can then neither verify that their
transactions were included nor prove they were excluded, leaving
them unsure of the security of their sidechain funds. Neither can
the smart-contract verify the validity of off-chain transactions from
the (irreversible) hash it receives. Hence, Plasma protocols (and pay-
ment channel networks) require users to be online to monitor
the root chain for periodic notarizations by the sidechain operator
and to immediately withdraw their funds if they suspect malicious
activity like the data availability attack, leading to the problem of
mass exits. A trivial solution could be to have the smart-contract
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Figure 1: In PayPlace, consumers transact instantly with the oper-
ator via individual payment channels. The operator then periodi-
cally tallies the payments that it owes to providers, acquires their
signatures on the commitment, and submits it to the root chain.
require signatures from all sidechain users on each commitment
submitted for notarization, thereby ensuring that the operator has
revealed the necessary information to them; however, the number
of signatures to be submitted and verified scales linearly with the
number of users, compounding resource costs, and still requires
users to always participate in the signing. In marketplaces with
many users, it is hard to guarantee that all users be always online.
PayPlace solves these challenges with novel constructions tai-
lored to the marketplace context. Figure 1 provides an overview of
our proposed framework (c denotes the cryptocurrency unit in use,
e.g., ETH or BTC). First, we realize that marketplace consumers
need not participate in the sidechain. Indeed, unidirectional pair-
wise payment channels [3], which impose practically no system
requirements or monetary risks on the payers, are sufficient for
consumers to make payments cheaply to the marketplace operator.
Consumers’ deposited funds in these payment channels are
then secure even if they are arbitrarily offline. We then design
a sidechain mechanism whereby the operator can make pay-
ment promises to providers by revealing the off-chain funds
accumulated in its unidirectional channels with consumers,
thereby overcoming the high liquidity requirements that would
be imposed if pairwise payments channels were used instead for
operator→provider transactions.We utilize Boneh–Lynn–Shacham
(BLS) signature aggregation [29] to securely and efficiently com-
bine providers’ signatures of a commitment into a single
one, avoiding the resource costs of large-scale signature verifi-
cation; to the best of our knowledge, no prior construction has
proposed an efficient signature-based scheme that provably over-
comes the limitations of Plasma-style sidechains. Our construction
also enables the smart-contract to accept commitments even
when some providers are unavailable to sign them, while con-
tinuing to protect the providers’ funds from operator malfeasance.
PayPlace is hence resilient to data availability attacks; further, Pay-
Place guarantees the non-repudiation of payments made by
the operator to providers once they have signed a commitment,
without storing each provider’s credentials or balances.
Since to the best of our knowledge no prior work has charac-
terized off-chain payment mechanisms beyond the simpler state
channels [39], we briefly discuss major off-chain payment mecha-
nisms proposed (Section 2) and then develop operator-mediated
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marketplace paymentmodels using pairwise payment chan-
nels and Plasma-style sidechains (Section 3). We then formal-
ize desirable security properties of an off-chain system for
operator-mediated marketplace payment transactions and
introduce the PayPlace model (Section 4). We develop the PayPlace
mechanism in detail and prove that PayPlace satisfies all identi-
fied properties (Section 5). We further consider the computational
and monetary costs with PayPlace vs. ZK Rollup in Ethereum (Sec-
tion 6) and show that PayPlace is up to 5 orders of magnitude
cheaper computationally, and 3 orders in terms of gas costs
when most providers participate in the PayPlace protocol. After a
brief discussion of limitations (Section 7), we conclude in Section 8.
2 Related Work
State channels are a widely used mechanism in which repeated
transactions between two users impose no marginal cost once some
initial overhead is incurred in setting up and depositing funds into
a pairwise channel between them. Such channels were first pro-
posed for Bitcoin [31] and are used, e.g., by Raiden Network [21].
Such pairwise channels are not sufficient for marketplaces where
consumers may connect with unknown providers for only a few
payments. Other designs [39, 44] facilitate transactions between
users without a direct payment channel by routing the payment
through shared intermediary channels. However, in large decentral-
ized marketplaces with sporadically online users, such routes may
not exist for some consumer-provider pairs. Further, the intermedi-
aries must commit funds to the route’s outgoing channel, which
then cannot be used to pay other users. Indeed, recent work has ex-
posed incentive compatibility issues with such intermediaries [27].
Sidechains, on the other hand, enable uses well beyond pairwise
payments. Proposed designs [24, 37] are in various stages of com-
pleteness and development, some similar to payment channels (e.g.,
Plasma Debit [17] and Plasma Cash [16]). Most sidechains are sim-
ilar to the originally proposed Plasma-style sidechains [41], with
Minimum Viable Plasma [12] and its improved version More Viable
Plasma [13] as one of the earliest constructions to use periodic root
chain notarization of off-chain payment transactions using short
commitments. The recently proposed Zero-Knowledge Rollup [15]
significantly differs from these. With this, the sidechain operator
computes a succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (zk-
SNARK) [26, 38] to prove to the smart-contract that each off-chain
payment transaction included in the proof is legitimate (signed
correctly with valid balances) without requiring validation of each
transaction individually by smart-contract. Certain zkSNARK tech-
niques attractively enable proof verification in constant time, i.e.,
independent of the number of transactions in this case. ZK Rollups
have garnered much recent interest; Ethereum’s eighth major net-
work update [11] recently implemented changes that specifically
optimize zkSNARK functionality. We show that PayPlace can be
several orders of magnitude cheaper than ZK Rollup.
3 Marketplace Payments with Existing Designs
We first construct a simple model for operator-mediated market-
place payments using pairwise channels between the operator and
consumers/service providers. Next, we demonstrate a Plasma-style
sidechain solution (based on MoreVP [13]) that involves periodic
transaction notarizations on the root chain. In Section 4, we show
that PayPlace utilizes a modified construction of the first model for
facilitating a part of the sidechain, and improves on Plasma-style
constructions by addressing their security challenges. For the rest
of this article, we use c to denote the cryptocurrency denomination
in use, e.g. ETH. Appendix A summarizes our notation.
3.1 Using Pairwise Payment Channels
A consumer c with public key pkc deposits c in the smart-contract,
to be spent incrementally in payments to the operator ω for orders
that she places in the marketplace. The deposit establishes a pair-
wise payment channel with ω. In our case, it suffices if the channel
is unidirectional since payments flow from the consumer to the
operator; hence the consumer need not be always online to guard
against operator malfeasance since she is not owed any funds in
this channel (with refunds and returns as external to the protocol).
An off-chain payment from c for an order consists of a trans-
action T = (µ,pkω ,pkc ), where µ is the payment amount denomi-
nated in c and the recipient is the operator with public key pkω , and
the digital signature of the transaction σ = S(T , skc ), which the
consumer generates using their private key skc . Since the consumer-
operator payment channel is unidirectional, the amount µ specified
in T indicates the total amount promised by the consumer to the
operator as of when T is generated, incorporating the incremental
amount the consumer intends to pay for their latest order in the
marketplace. Hence, µ is the total amount of the consumer’s funds
in the channel that is owned by the operator as of this transac-
tion. We let s(T ) and µ(T ) denote the sending consumer’s public
key pkc and amount µ specified in transaction T respectively. The
consumer may deposit more c at any time for use in the market-
place. We therefore use Dc,t and µ∗c,t to denote the total funds
deposited and spent (in off-chain payments with the operator),
respectively, by consumer c as of time t . Note that the operator
knows the deposited funds Dc,t since deposits and top-ups (as well
as withdrawals) happen through the contract on the root chain,
which stores and updates Dc,t for each consumer. The operator
verifies an off-chain payment transaction T sent by consumer c at
time t by evaluating if the sender has sufficient balance to make
this transaction (i.e. µ(T ) ≤ Dc,t ) and ensuring that the operator
balance in c’s payment channel only increases as a result of T (i.e.
µ∗c,t ≤ µ(T )) thereby ensuring payment unidirectionality. The oper-
ator also verifies the digital signature σ with verification function
V;V(pkc ,T ,σ ) = 1 if skc was used to sign T to yield σ .
To forward these consumer payments to providers (who may be
assigned at the time of order placement or later on), the operator
generates new transactions that make payment promises to to
each appropriate provider p. To do so, the operator establishes a
unidirectional payment channel with each provider and deposits
sufficient funds in each for relaying later payments. An off-chain
payment transaction from the operator to a provider p is then
defined as T ′ = (µ ′,pkp ,pkω ), sourced from the funds deposited
by the operator ω in his channel with p, along with the associated
signature. Similar to T , the specified µ ′ in T ′ represents the total
amount of the operator’s funds in this channel that is owned by
the provider as of this transaction. To withdraw these funds, the
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recipient (operator or provider) simply provides the last signed
off-chain transaction received from the sender to the contract.
A significant drawback of this model is the high liquidity require-
ments it imposes on the operator, who must forecast the estimated
payouts to each provider and deposit sufficient c in each channel
so as to minimize the root chain transactions (which incur fees
and time) involved in adding more funds to the channel. This re-
quirement arises because funds from consumers’ payments in the
pairwise channels are not accessible for use with others until the op-
erator initiates a root chain transaction to transfer the funds to their
address. Hence, we now provide a formalization of Plasma-style
sidechains for operator-mediated marketplace payments, where op-
erators can directly forward payments they receive from consumers
to providers. The PayPlace protocol utilizes aspects of pairwise pay-
ment channels and Plasma-style sidechains (discussed below) to
enable secure marketplace transactions at scale.
3.2 Using Plasma-style Sidechains
In the more general sidechain model, deposits in the smart-contract
can be used to pay any participant of the sidechain (i.e., consumers
/providers/the operator). Sincewe are interested in operator-mediated
marketplace transactions, we characterize a model where con-
sumers use their deposits to make payments using the sidechain to
the operator (e.g., at the time of order placement) and the operator
in turn makes payments to providers using the sidechain as well
(note that the marketplace operator is also the sidechain operator).
Let time be discretized and the resulting points in time be indexed
by t = 1, 2, . . .. Consumers’ deposits of c in the contract are realized
as Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXOs) [32] in the sidechain. An
off-chain payment transaction from a consumer to the operator
then specifies the payment amount (i.e. the incremental amount
corresponding to the order placed by the consumer), the recipient
pkω , and a reference to UTXO that the consumer owns and wishes
to use for this off-chain transaction. Unlike the simpler payment
channels, an off-chain transaction received in the sidechain is not
immediately guaranteed to be available for use by the recipient
until the transaction is notarized in a Plasma block.
We now describe the generation and notarization process of a
Plasma block. The operator periodically generates a Plasma block
every ta time slots, containing all the signed payment transactions
that have transpired off-chain since the last notarized block was
generated. A Plasma block is defined by κ = (T,M) where T con-
tains the off-chain payment transactions arranged by some ordering
andM is the Merkle tree with leaves corresponding to hashes of
the transactions in T. The operator then generates a short commit-
ment to the Plasma block κ, which contains information that the
Plasma contract on the root chain uses to notarize the sidechain
transaction activity corresponding to κ. For the main Plasma con-
structions [12, 13], this commitment is simply the root of the Merkle
treeM, which is short and avoid the excess storage costs that would
be incurred if the entire transaction activity were to be individually
verified on-chain. The operator submits this commitment to the
smart-contract which simply stores it. We denote by Kt the set of
Plasma blocks corresponding to accepted commitments as of time t ,
ordered by the times they were accepted, withKt (−1),Kt (−2), . . . de-
noting the latest accepted block, the previous accepted block, and so
on. Once a consumer’s off-chain payment is included in a notarized
Plasma block, the operator may similarly generate an off-chain
payment to providers that references UTXOs that the operator now
owns as a result of the consumers’ notarized payment.
To withdraw funds from the sidechain, a user must provide a
Merkle proof showing that a valid transaction (signed by the pre-
vious owner of the funds) assigning them their UTXO has been
included in one of the committed Plasma blocks. We use Tp (κ) (and
by extension, Tω (κ)) to denote the set of off-chain payment trans-
actions included in Plasma block κ that assigned funds to provider
p (or the operator ω). Hence, a valid off-chain payment transaction
received on the sidechain constitutes funds available for subsequent
use by the recipient only when it is included in Tp (κ) where κ is
a block whose commitment (i.e., Merkle root) has been notarized
on the root chain. However, this process allows a participant (e.g.,
the operator) to maliciously withdraw UTXOs assigned to them
in a notarized Plasma block that are spent in subsequent Plasma
blocks (e.g., to pay providers). Hence, the contract imposes a chal-
lenge period on withdrawals, during which anyone may contest the
withdrawal by showing a Merkle proof that the UTXO in question
has been spent in a subsequently notarized block.
This model exposes consumers as well as providers to mali-
cious attacks from the operator. Both consumers (whose deposited
funds are now UTXOs in the sidechain) and providers (who are
assigned UTXOs in the sidechain as payments by the operator)
risk losing their funds if the operator inserts invalid out-of-nowhere
transactions in a block [12]. These withdrawals may be detected
as valid, and the operator can drain the contract of funds. This
generic sidechain design, when applied to marketplaces, also ex-
poses providers to counter-consumer risk. Consumers, like oper-
ators, may attempt to withdraw spent UTXOs. Existing protocols
prevent this by allowing older UTXOs to be exited first when a with-
drawal is initiated [13], but such a solution results mass exits that
flood the root chain with a high volume of exit transactions, leading
also to high transaction fees. Even so, to contest the withdrawal of
a spent UTXO or to proactively exit when the operator includes
an out-of-nowhere transaction, consumers and providers must be
online to monitor side-chain activity and submitted exits. Finally,
the operator may well commit a hash to the root chain, without
revealing the corresponding Plasma block to the sidechain partici-
pants. This data availability attack leaves consumers and providers
unsure of what transactions were included in a committed Plasma
block, forcing them to withdraw their funds (in case the operator
had inserted malicious transactions) and resulting in mass exits.
Since there are no checks performed by the contract to verify that
the transactions included in a commitment are valid and to protect
against these attacks, this design poses risks to funds that providers
and consumers have on the sidechain, unless they are always online
to detect potential malicious activity and react proactively.
4 PayPlace Overview
We now identify system and security properties that are highly
desirable in an off-chain system for marketplace payments, which
also ensure resiliency against the various attacks discussed in pre-
vious payment models. Using the notation and models introduced
in Section 3, we subsequently develop the PayPlace system model.
4
4.1 Goals
We define a user (i.e. consumer/provider/operator) u as active at
time t , i.e. A(u, t) = 1, if the user is listening to smart-contract
events on the root chain and incoming messages from the operator
at t and responds by the protocol of the payment mechanism in use.
We further define confirmed funds fc,t as the total funds available
to a consumer c for spending in off-chain payment transactions in
the marketplace as of time t and f ′p,t as the total funds available
for a provider p (or operator, if p = ω) for withdrawal as of time t .
Our first property ensures predictable execution time:
Definition 1 (Liveness). A withdrawal initiated by a provider
or the operator at any time must impose no wait-times and execute to
completion immediately, subject to transaction processing latency of
the underlying root chain.
Liveness is especially important because protocols like Plasma
MVP and MoreVP rely on exit games where users are forced to
wait for a significant period of time after initiating exits in order
to prevent potential attacks (as described in Section 3). Next, it is
important to ensure that funds deposited by the consumer in the
smart-contract for spending in the marketplace are not withdrawn
by an operator or provider without the consumer’s permission.
Definition 2 (Consumer Safety). If a consumer c makes exactly
one payment or withdrawal of value α between times t and t ′, then
fc,t ′ = fc,t − α for any value of A(c, t ′′),∀t ′′ ∈ (t , t ′).
Definition 3 (Operator Safety). If the operator ω makes ex-
actly one withdrawal of value α between times t and t ′, then f ′ω,t ′ =
fω,t − α for any value of A(ω, t ′′),∀t ′′ ∈ (t , t ′).
Definition 4 (Provider Safety). If a provider p makes exactly
one withdrawal for α between times t and t ′, then f ′p,t ′ = fp,t − α
for any value of A(p, t ′′), t ′′ ∈ (t , t ′).
Satisfying these properties ensures that the sidechain is reli-
able: neither consumers, nor providers, nor the operator are at risk
anytime of having funds already assigned to them through the nota-
rization process stolen, even if they are arbitrarily inactive. Further,
as defined below, as long as the operator is non-malicious, an active
provider participating in the notarization process should continue
receiving additional funds for new orders (from consumers) that
they fulfil, irrespective of other providers’ actions.
Definition 5 (Income Certainty). A valid off-chain payment
sent to the operator from a consumer at t in order to pay provider
p is available as confirmed funds f ′p,t ′ (less any fee charged by the
operator) as of some t ′ > t , as long as the provider and the operator
have been active active A(p, t ′′) = 1 and A(ω, t ′′) = 1 ∀t ′′ ∈ [t , t ′]
(i.e. they follow the protocol during [t , t ′]), irrespective of the actions
of any other participant.
This ensures that providers are not subject to counter-provider
risk in receiving additional income. For instance, PayPlace requires
providers’ signatures to publish new commitments, but malicious
providers withholding signatures would ideally not affect legiti-
mate providers. However, the operator may maliciously withhold
information about what payments have been made to providers in
notarized Plasma blocks (e.g., as in MVP/MoreVP), hence leaving
providers unsure of what funds are available for withdrawal.
Definition 6 (Data Availability). Consumers, providers, and
operators know their confirmed funds fc,t , f ′p,t , and f ′ω,t at any time t
and are guaranteed to have received all information necessary to prove
ownership of the funds and withdraw them from the smart-contract.
Finally, we define Liquidity Pooling; the operator need not use their
own capital to relay consumers’ payments to providers.
Definition 7 (Liqidity Pooling). The operator can directly use
liquidity created by consumers’ off-chain payments to pay providers.
4.2 PayPlace System Model
PayPlace is a sidechain system tailored for the marketplace context.
It leverages simple and secure payment channels for consumer→
operator payments and uses a novel notarization mechanism for
secure operator→provider payment forwarding wherein the oper-
ator reuses funds received in the payment channels without having
to first withdraw these funds on the root chain.
Assumptions We assume the root chain supports BLS signa-
ture verification [28–30]. The BLS scheme utilizes pairing-friendly
elliptic curves to generate short digital signatures that can be effi-
ciently aggregated, which is especially useful for building scalable
blockchain protocols. The BLS signature scheme and associated
operations like hashing to the elliptic curve are currently being stan-
dardized [1, 6] and popular systems like Ethereum 2.0, Zcash, Chia,
and Polkadot already utilize BLS signatures [4, 18, 19, 22]. We use
the multiplicative notation for groups, and references to credentials
and signatures hereon mean BLS, unless otherwise stated.
Preliminaries Let e : G0 × G1 → GT be an efficiently com-
putable, non-degenerate pairing where G0, G1 and GT are groups
of prime order q, and д0, д1 are generators of G0, G1 respectively.
Suppose signatures reside in G0 and public keys in G1. H then de-
notes the hash function that maps from the message space into G0.
S(m, sk) generates sk’s signature onm, returning σ = H0(m)sk ∈
G0.V(pk,m,σ ) verifies if sk signedm to yield σ by evaluating if
e(д1,σ ) = e(pk,H0(m)), and returning 1 in that case.
Consumer TransactionsA consumer’s deposit in the PayPlace
smart-contract results in a unidirectional payment channel from the
consumer to the operator. The consumer→operator payment flow
works as specified earlier in Section 3.1, with the exception that con-
sumers here are not permitted to withdraw funds already deposited
in the channel (e.g. akin to topping up a store card). Further, we use
Ct to denote the set of the latest off-chain transactions received by
the operator from every consumer as of time t .
Provider Transactions A “Plasma” block in PayPlace reflects
the total funds owed by the operator to providers. Hence at any time
t , the last notarized blockKt (−1) incorporates all relevant payment
history from previous blocks; thus a notarized commitment replaces
the previous one. A provider p registers with the PayPlace smart-
contract by calling an enrollment function, which we specify in
Section 5. The operator periodically consolidates payments owed
to each registered provider every ta time slots (accounting for
new consumer orders placed in that duration and providers who
fulfilled them) and generates payment transactions T ′. Here, T ′ =
(µ ′,pkp ,pkc ) where µ ′ represents the total amount owed by the
operator to provider p based on all orders from consumer c (i.e., not
limited to the orders placed in the last ta time slots) since p’s last
withdrawal.pkc specifies the consumer c fromwhose unidirectional
5
	Figure 2: We show example Tp that promises funds to pkp . Each
Tp is hashed to a leaf node Lp (M) in the Merkle node. A succinct
Merkle proof of inclusion Pp (M(κ)) can be provided for Tp .
payment channel the operator sources funds for T ′ (i.e., from the
operator-owned portion of the funds in that channel). That is, µ is
the total amount owed by the operator to p for orders placed by
c , since the last time p withdrew their funds from the sidechain.
We abuse notation and use µ(T ′) and s(T ′) to denote the payment
amount µ and the referenced consumer pkc in T ′. Every ta units,
a provider p hence receives an off-chain transaction T ′ for each
consumer whose order(s) p has fulfilled since p last withdrew their
funds from the sidechain; we use Tp to denote these transactions.
The operator then generates a block κ = (T,M) containing the
set of these payment transactions that it has generated for each
provider. We let Tp (κ) denote the transactions for provider p that
are included in κ, whileM(κ) and R(M(κ)) denote the Merkle tree
included in κ and the Merkle tree’s root respectively. In PayPlace,
each leaf Lp (M) in the resulting Merkle treeM(κ) corresponds to
the hash of the set of all payment transactions Tp (κ) for a provider p
as illustrated in Figure 2, unlike the Plasma-style sidechain model
introduced earlier where each transaction individually constitutes
a leaf. Hence, T contains the sets Tp for each provider p, appearing
in the same order as the corresponding hashes appear in the leaves
ofM(κ). We use T(κ) to denote this ordered set of all transactions
included inκ. The operator also includes a similar set of transactions
Tω assigned to himself, reflecting any commission deducted from
consumers’ payments for providing the sidechain service. Since
Tω is identical to any other Tp , we do not differentiate between
the operator and the provider when referring to the payees of a
block, unless required. Finally, we denote the Merkle proof [36]
of Tp (κ) by Pp (M), i.e., Pp (M) proves that Tp (κ) corresponds to
Lp (M). The set of providers that have leaves inM(κ) is denoted
by P(κ).
On-chainNotarizations andWithdrawalsWhile the Plasma-
style sidechain model uses the root of the generated Merkle tree
R(M(κ)) for notarizing the Plasma block κ (see Section 3.2), Pay-
Place incorporates a mechanism for commitment generation that
prevents data availability (and other) attacks. At a high level, the
smart-contract rejects a submitted Merkle root for notarization
unless the root has been signed by all registered providers, thus
ensuring that the operator reveals the entire block to providers in
order to acquire their signature and enabling providers to verify
that the block is uncorrupted. The commitment generation and
commitment verification modules, which ensure that providers’
𝑫𝒄,𝒕 𝝁𝒄,𝒕∗𝒇𝒄,𝒕 𝒘𝒄,𝒕∗
Figure 3: State of consumer c ’s channel with the operator at time t .
Dc,t refers to total deposited funds, of which µ∗c,t belongs to the op-
erator.w∗c,t represents the portion of this that has been withdrawn.
funds are secure even if they are unavailable for signing the gener-
ated Merkle root, are explained in detail in Section 5.
As defined in Section 4.1, a user’s confirmed funds refers to the
funds assigned to her that are available to be spent or withdrawn.
We further define accessible funds as funds for which the user has
sufficient information to successfully withdraw. In the Plasma con-
struction from Section 3.2, the data availability attack allows the
operator to force users’ confirmed funds to be only partially ac-
cessible. For PayPlace, we define a provider p’s (or operator ω’s)
confirmed funds in a notarized block κ as the funds Tp (κ) assigned
to her in κ if κ was notarized with p’s signature included, less any
withdrawals made against κ after notarization. Once p has been
allocated funds in κ, PayPlace ensures that these funds are always
accessible even if subsequently notarized blocks do not include p’s
signature. We denote p’s accessible funds in a notarized block κ (i.e.
κ = Kt (−x) for some x) as T′p (κ). We let κp denote the last nota-
rized block that included p’s signature and tp the corresponding
time. Then, p’s confirmed funds are: f ′p,t = Tp (κp ) −w ′p,t where
w ′p,t denotes funds withdrawn by p between tp and current time t .
When p (or ω) initiates a withdrawal of funds, the contract’s
withdrawal module requires a Merkle proof showing that the
stated funds are included in the latest accepted notarization and
have not already been withdrawn, as we detail in Section 5. Fig-
ure 2 shows that the funds promised to a payee in a block refer to
the operator’s funds in specific consumer channels. Hence when
a provider or operator calls the contract’s withdrawal function,
sufficient detail must be provided to identify these consumer chan-
nels. We definew∗c,t as the total funds withdrawn (by the operator
and providers) against the operator’s channel with c as of time t .
Since PayPlace does not allow consumer withdrawals, a consumer’s
confirmed funds at time t is simply their total deposits less off-chain
payments, i.e., fc,t = Dc,t −µ∗c,t (Figure 3). Since consumers initiate
payments to the operator and PayPlace ensures Consumer Safety
(shown in Section 5), consumers know their confirmed funds fc,t .
Finally, we note that the off-chain payment promises T ′ from
the operator to providers need not be signed since the PayPlace
smart-contract allows withdrawals only against operator-owned funds
in the operator’s channels with consumers. Since only the operator
is authorized to submit commitments to the root chain against
which withdrawals are processed,T ′ does not require the operator’s
signature, reducing computational overhead. Appendix B provides
a numerical example illustrating the PayPlace framework.
Potential Attack Vectors We consider potential attacks that
may arise in PayPlace. In subsequent Section 5, we illustrate the
protocol’s robustness to them. First, the operator may attempt to
double-spend funds when generating block κ. That is, the set of
payments to providers T(κ) may reference more funds than the op-
erator owns in a channel with a consumer, or may refer to funds in
channels with non-existent consumers. Further, since the contract
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Figure 4: The commitment generation process triggers every ta
timesteps; the commitment is submitted to the smart-contract
within a predefined γ timesteps. Withdrawals and registrations are
frozen until γ + δ timesteps have passed.
only stores the notarization for the latest block (which assigns the
cumulative funds owed by the operator to each provider since each
provider’s last withdrawal), the operator is incentivized to mali-
ciously playback older signed commitments that assigned lower
income to providers than the most recent one. In addition, PayPlace
uses BLS signatures for efficient signature aggregation and verifica-
tion, which are generally prone to the rogue public-key attack [42],
where a malicious entity in a group can forge the group’s aggre-
gated signature on any message (see Appendix C for more details).
Such attacks may violate the Provider and Consumer Safety proper-
ties. Finally, providers may maliciously withhold their signatures
on the Merkle root of a generated block, forcing the contract to
reject the notarization and hence halt continued assignment of new
payments from operators to providers (violating Income Certainty).
5 PayPlace Specification and Analysis
We now explain the PayPlace modules introduced in Section 4 and
prove PayPlace’s security properties (proofs in Appendix D).
5.1 Protocol Description
To protect against timing-related attacks, we introduce temporal
restrictions on provider and operator actions. Suppose the oper-
ator starts the sidechain at time t0; without loss of generality we
take t0 = 0. Let γ ≪ ta denote the (predefined) maximum time
required for the operator to generate a new commitment ready for
notarization every ta interval, and δ ≪ ta the maximum finality
time for the root blockchain. The smart-contract enforces freeze pe-
riods during which funds may not be withdrawn and new providers
may not register, namely, [ta − δ , ta + γ + δ ], [2ta − δ , 2ta + γ + δ ],
[3ta − δ , 3ta + γ + δ ], . . . The operator may submit new commit-
ments for notarization only during the commitment submission win-
dow within each freeze period, given by [ta , ta + γ ], [2ta , 2ta + γ ],
[3ta , 3ta + γ ], . . . Figure 4 depicts the timing of these events, which
can be triggered and managed using decentralized oracles [23].
5.1.1 Provider Registration The provider registration process in
PayPlace is necessary for ensuring that the smart-contract has suffi-
cient information to verify whether block commitments submitted
by the operator are signed by (registered) providers. The contract
can then enforce rules that protect providers’ confirmed funds.
A provider p may register with the PayPlace smart-contract only
when no freeze windows are active. The contract tracks the pub-
lic keys of providers who registered or withdrew funds since the
last block was notarized; we denote this list (or equivalently the
indices of keys in the list) by B. Registrations are processed only if
pkp < B (i.e., a recently registered provider cannot register again).
To register, p first sends a Proof of Possession (PoP) of her creden-
tials to the operator. In other words, the provider uses her secret
key skp to sign her public key, generating σp, init = S(pkp , skp ).
If the operator successfully verifies p’s signature on the PoP, i.e.
V(pkp ,pkp ,σp, init) = 1, it signs p’s public key combined with the
current timestamp ts , i.e., ω generates σω,p = S(m=(pkp , ts ), skω ).
The operator returns σω,p to the provider, who provides it and ts
to the smart-contract’s enrollment function. If σω,p is valid (i.e.,
V(pkω ,m=(pkp , ts ),σω,p ) = 1 and ts falls outside a freeze window
(i.e. t ′a + γ + δ < ts < t < t ′a + ta − δ , where t ′a denotes the time of
the last commitment generation event and t the current time), the
enrollment is successful.
Essentially, the contract ensures that p has provided her PoP
to the operator (which is then used to generate commitments); a
valid σω,p provided by p to the contract indicates that the opera-
tor received p’s PoP and sent that in return. Note that if the root
chain does not support BLS account keys (i.e., the keys used for
signing blockchain transactions do not support BLS operations),
the provider must explicitly specify their BLS public key pkp to
the smart-contract during registration and provide a PoP for it. In
PayPlace, this PoP is σp,BLS = S(m=(pkp ,pk ′p ), skp ), where pk ′p is
p’s root chain account key. Since the account credentials on the root
chain are different from the ones used for signing in PayPlace, the
providermust provideσp,BLS for any transaction (e.g., withdrawals)
with the smart-contract to prove its identity. The contract stores an
aggregated public key apk of registered providers, which requires
much less storage than their individual public keys. Upon successful
enrollment of p, the contract updates the aggregated public key
apk = apk · pkp (apk = pkp if no other providers have registered)
and broadcasts the new value of apk . Since p cannot be allocated
funds until the next commitment submission window, the contract
adds pkp to B, its list of providers with zero on-chain balance. If the
operator charges any fees for providing the sidechain/marketplace,
it must register as a provider itself to deduct these fees from con-
sumer payments. The operator is treated like any other provider
with respect to the notarization and withdrawal of its funds.
Lemma 1. In PayPlace, a public key pkp can be registered only
by its owner p (who knows skp ). Further, unless p colludes with the
operator, she can register pkp only once.
Even if a malicious operator generates a σω,p for a provider who
registered previously (i.e., not included in B) to re-register, any
potential corruption to apk does not affect previously confirmed
funds of any participant, as we later show.
5.1.2 Commitment Generation The operator periodically generates
short commitments of payments owed to providers and submits this
to the smart-contract. Coupled with the commitment verification
module that the contract executes, this construction ensures re-
silience to the data availability attack and secures providers’ funds.
Every ta timesteps, the operator first consolidates new payments
received from consumers in the previous ta timesteps and gener-
ates a block κ reflecting the total funds (since t0 less any completed
withdrawals) that it owes to each provider. As described in Sec-
tion 4.2, Tp (κ) also specifies the consumers in whose channels the
operator has these funds. Then, the operator broadcasts the set of
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transactions T(κ), the Merkle tree M(κ), the set Ct of the most
recent consumer→operator transaction for each consumer, and
the current timestamp ts , to all providers and waits up to γ ′ < γ
timesteps for their responses. During this time, each provider p
signs the tuple (R(M(κ)), ts ) of the Merkle tree’s root and the times-
tamp, and sends it to the operator, if the following five conditions
are met.
First, current time t as well as ts should be inside a commitment
submission window, i.e., t ′a < ts ≤ t < t ′a + γ where t ′a denotes the
time of the last commitment generation event. Second, exactly one
leaf Lp (M(κ)) = H (Tp (κ)) in the Merkle tree should correspond
to payment promises for p (H is a one-way irreversible hash func-
tion). Third, for each transactionT ′ ∈ Tp (κ) assigning funds to p, a
valid off-chain payment transaction from the source consumer s(T ′)
to the operator should be present in Ct , i.e., V(pks(T ′),T ,σ ) = 1
where (T ,σ ) ∈ Ct and s(T ) = s(T ′). The provider further veri-
fies that the amounts of these source transactions do not exceed
the consumer’s total deposited funds, i.e., µ(T ) ≤ Ds(T ),t where
(T ,σ ) ∈ Ct and s(T ) = s(T ′), to prevent consumer-operator collu-
sion attacks. Note that since consumer deposits and top-ups happen
on the root chain, they and associated states like Dc,t are known
to all providers. Fourth, the amount µ(T ) specified in consumer
s(T )’s off-chain payment to the operator must be sufficient for all
payment promises sourced from s(T ) that are made by the opera-
tor in κ. That is, for each transaction T ′ ∈ Tp (κ) and (T ,σ ) ∈ Ct
with s(T ) = s(T ′), ∑v ∈P(κ)∑T ′′∈Tv (κ) 1s(T ′′)=s(T )µ(T ′′) ≤ µ(T ) −
w∗s(T ),t , where 1s(T ′′)=s(T ) = 1 iff s(T ) = s(T ′′), and the double
sum runs over all transactions (payment promises) in κ. Finally, the
Merkle tree computed from T(κ) must equalM(κ).
These checks help secure provider and consumer funds under
certain conditions: (as we show later in this section, the broader
Provider and Consumer Safety properties unconditionally hold in
PayPlace)
Theorem 1. Suppose that providers and the operator can only
withdraw funds that have been assigned to them in κ and can perform
this withdrawal only once. Then, if a provider follow the PayPlace
protocol and signs the commitment (R(M(κ)), ts ), their funds Tp (κ)
are safe, i.e. cannot be withdrawn by anyone else.
Lemma 2. Suppose that providers and the operator can only with-
draw funds that have been assigned to them in κ and can perform this
withdrawal only once. Then, if all providers follow the PayPlace pro-
tocol and sign the commitment (R(M(κ)), ts ), consumers’ available
funds are safe.
We letAt denote the public keys (or indices, depending on usage)
of active providerswho attest their signature to the commitment and
return it within γ ′. Some providers may not sign even if the checks
above pass, e.g., if they are offline or malicious. The set of public
keys of missing providers (or their indices, depending on usage)
is denoted by Mt . The operator first verifies received signatures
and computes an aggregated root signature arsκ =
∏
p∈At σp,κ .
Since withdrawals happen on the root chain, the operator tracks
providers who have exited the sidechain since the last commitment
and denotes these providers by Xt (At ,Mt , and Xt are disjoint).
The operator then submits the following commitment for nota-
rization: the Merkle tree root R(M(κ)); the associated timestamp
ts ; the public keys of providers exited since the last published com-
mitment, Xt ; and information on active and missing providers. The
active provider information consists of their aggregated public key
apkactive =
∏
p∈At pkp and signature arsκ . For providers who were
missing from the previous published commitment but active in the
current one, i.e. p ∈ Mt−ta and p < Mt ∪Xt , the operator provides
the transactions they had last signed for, i.e. Tp (κp ). The missing
provider information consists ofMt ; for each p ∈ Mt , the operator
also includes: the provider’s PoP σp, init (collected during registra-
tion); the list Tp (κ) of payment promises made to p in κ; Merkle
proofs of their inclusion, Pp (M(κ)); and p’s confirmed funds Tp (κp )
(i.e., transactions from the last published commitment p signed).
If p signed the previous published commitment, i.e. κp = Kt (−1),
the operator also includes the Merkle proof Pp (M(Kt (−1)). Finally,
as in Figure 4, the commitment must be generated and submitted
to the contract within γ timesteps; otherwise the operator must
wait ta slots to restart the commitment generation process (we
discuss the consequences of this constraint in Section 7). For ease
of explanation, we next describe the withdrawal process before
explaining the commitment verification process.
5.1.3 Withdrawals Towithdraw funds from the sidechain, a provider
(or the operator) must call the contract’s withdrawal function out-
side the withdrawal freeze window. The design of this module, cou-
pled with how a commitment is generated, guarantees safety of
consumer fundswhile allowing providers towithdraw funds against
the operator’s balance in consumer channels (i.e., Liquidity Pool-
ing). The smart-contract also allows the operator to initiate such a
withdrawal on behalf of a provider; as we show in the commitment
verification module and Section 6, registered providers who consis-
tently fail to participate in the commitment signing process impose
high monetary costs on the operator due to the increased compu-
tations needed to ensure that their funds are safe. Hence allowing
operators to curtail these monetary costs is useful in practice.
The provider (or operator) calling the withdrawal function sub-
mits a set of transactions Tp . For each T ′ ∈ Tp that assigns funds
µ(T ′) to p based on the operator’s unidirectional channel with con-
sumer c = s(T ′), the contract also expects a corresponding trans-
action T and signature σ from consumer c (withV(pkc ,T ,σ ) = 1)
assigning at least µ(T ′) funds to pkω as input to the withdrawal
function. Note that this transaction T is revealed to providers as
Ct by the operator during commitment generation. The provider
must also specify whether the withdrawal is a permanent exit (i.e.,
the provider does not expect future payments from the operator).
Before explaining how the withdrawal is processed, we first de-
scribe additional information that the contract tracks. The contract
stores B and X, respectively the set of providers who registered
or finished non-permanent withdrawals and the set who finished
permanent withdrawals since the last commitment was published.
The contract also tracks the setM of public keys (or correspond-
ing indices, depending on usage) of registered providers who did
not sign the last published commitment Kt (−1). It also notes the
number of consecutive commitments that each missing provider
in this list has failed to sign; we use M(−x) to refer to providers
whose signatures were absent from the last x = 1, 2, . . . published
commitments. The contract also stores the list L of leaf nodes
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assigned to missing providers in the Merkle tree of the commit-
ment that they last signed, i.e., Lp (M(κp )) for missing providers
p ∈ M; we use Lp to denote p’s entry in L. Finally, N(−x) de-
notes the public keys of consumers in whose channel a missing
provider p ∈ M(−x) is owed funds as well as the total funds that all
providers inM(−x) are owed in the channel. For example, suppose
M(−1) = {pka }, M(−2) = {pkb ,pkc ,pkd } and that pka , pkb , pkc ,
pkd had 10c, 30c, 40c, 50c sourced from pkc1,pkc5,pkc1,pkc5 respec-
tively. Then N(−1) = {(pkc1, 10)}, N(−2) = {(pkc1, 40), (pkc5, 80)}.
Finally, we use N(−x)pkc to denote the amount (in c) stored in
N(−x) corresponding to consumer pkc ’s channel. In the considered
example, N(−1)pkc1 = 10c, N(−2)pkc1 = 40c and N(−2)pkc5 = 80c.
Note that a provider who has already withdrawn funds against
the last published commitment cannot maliciously initiate a with-
drawal again since they are tracked in X or B. If p < X ∪ B, the
withdrawal function checks if p is in the listM of providers whose
signature was missing from the last commitment Kt (−1). In that
case, the contract checks whether the transaction set submitted byp
corresponds to the one stored for p in L, i.e. it checks ifH (Tp ) = Lp .
If so, it transfers the funds assigned top in each transactionT ′ ∈ Tp ,
subject to the available (not yet withdrawn) operator-owned bal-
ance in the operator’s channel with the specified source consumers.
Combined with the commitment verification process (explained
later), this protects providers from the data availability attack. Even
providers who may not have received Kt (−1) from the operator for
signing, or who refused to sign it, can access funds previously allocated
to them by providing the transaction set Tp (κp ).
As evident from this, the accessible funds T ′p (Kt (−1)) (i.e., funds
that p can submit for withdrawal) against the latest commitment
may be different from Tp (Kt (−1)) if Kt (−1) was not signed by
p. The contract only allows a provider (whose signature was not
present in the previous commitment) to withdraw funds based on
the transaction set that they last signed for (i.e., Tp (κp ), which is
tracked in Lp ). We thus ensure that confirmed funds (i.e., funds that
they signed for) are accessible and incentivize providers to be active
and participate in the commitment generation process in order to
continue receiving additional income from the operator.
Finally, we describe the amount of c that is transferred upon a
successful withdrawal. Note that whilew∗c,t (see Figure 3) is known
to the smart-contract (since withdrawals happen through the con-
tract), it may not know the most recent value of the operator-owned
balance µ∗c,t in that channel since consumer payments to the oper-
ator happen off-chain. We hence use µ ′c,t to represent the highest
operator-owned balance in the channel with c known to the contract
(as revealed by the consumer→operator source transactions sub-
mitted by providers during withdrawals). Finally, let x represent the
number of consecutive (accepted) commitments that the withdraw-
ing provider p failed to sign, i.e. x : p ∈ M(−x). Then, for providers
whose signatures have beenmissing for longer than x commitments,
the contract must ensure that p cannot withdraw their confirmed
funds (as of the last block they signed for) by colluding with the
operator to misappropriate their funds to p in subsequently gener-
ated block commitments. Hence the final amount transferred to p is:
min(max(µ ′c,t −
∑x−1
i=ηt N(−i)pkc −w∗c,t , 0), µ(T ′)) for eachT ′ ∈ Tp
with c = s(T ′), where ηt denotes the largest number of consecutive
signatures missed by a provider currently tracked inM at time t .
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Does	𝒕𝒔 fall	inside	the	
current	commitment	
generation	window?
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Figure 5: Flowchart depicting the PayPlace smart-contract’s verifi-
cation procedure for determining whether to accept or reject a com-
mitment submitted by the operator for notarization.
Finally, if p is not in the missing provider listM, x = 0. The same
expression is evaluated to compute the funds to be transferred, and
the contract expects a valid Merkle proof Pp (M(Kt (−1))) for Tp .
After the withdrawal, for each source consumer c specified in Tp ,
the contract updatesw∗c,t . If p ∈ M, it updates N(−x)pkc to deduct
the funds withdrawn from each channel c = s(T ′) for T ′ ∈ Tp ,
removes p fromM and removes Lp . The provider is added to either
X, if the withdrawal is permanent, or B, if it is not.
Lemma 3. PayPlace ensures Consumer Safety.
Lemma 4. PayPlace provides Liveness and Liquidity Pooling.
5.1.4 Commitment Verification When the operator submits a new
block commitment at t , the withdrawal function first checks if a
commitment submission window is currently active, i.e. if t ′a <
ts ≤ t < t ′a +γ where t ′a denotes the start of the latest commitment
generation window and ts is provided by the operator. If not, the
commitment is rejected. Then, the contract verifies whether all
registered providers have signed the submitted Merkle root (i.e.,
V(apk,m=(R(M(κ)), ts ),ars) = 1). If so, their funds are implicitly
secure (i.e., Provider Safety) since a provider attests their signature
only if the validity checks specified in the Commitment Genera-
tion process above succeed. Further, this ensures the generated
block was revealed to all providers. If these conditions are met,
the contract successfully stores the block, deletes the previous com-
mitment (Kt (−1)), and clears the listsM, N, X, B and L. Note that
the ts check guards against a replay attack (of older commitments).
However, extra steps are needed to ensure provider safety and data
availability for those whose signatures are not included in arsκ .
The decision-making process used by the smart-contract to ac-
cept or reject submitted commitments is summarized in Figure 5.
If some providers are missing (i.e., ars verification against apk
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Protocol Liveness ConsumerSafety
Provider
Safety
Income
Certainty
Data
Availability
Liquidity
Pooling
Pairwise Payment Channel −− ✓ −− ✓ ✓ −−
Plasma-style Sidechain −− −− −− ✓ −− ✓
ZK Rollup ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
PayPlace ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 1: Properties guaranteed by different sidechainmechanisms applied to themarketplace context. Note that operator safety always holds.
fails and missing provider information is specified by the oper-
ator in the provided commitment), the contract checks that the
aggregate public key apk of registered providers matches the aggre-
gated key from the provided active, missing, and exited providers
(i.e., apkactive ∗
∏
v ∈Mt v
∏
p∈Xt p = apk . The commitment is re-
jected if this fails. Such rejected commitments serve to retain a
valid Kt (−1) and protect providers’ confirmed funds. If the sub-
mitted list of exited providers Xt is a subset of X, and the pro-
vided active providers have correctly signed the commitment, i.e.,
V(apkactive, (R(M(κ)), ts ),ars) = 1, then the contract accepts the
commitment as long as it can verify that the provided creden-
tials for missing providersMt are valid and their funds have not
been reduced in the current commitment. Note that apkactive ∗∏
v ∈Mt v
∏
p∈Xt p = apk is not sufficient to verify that all regis-
tered providers have been accounted for in arsκ ,Mt and Xt . Possi-
ble attacks are demonstrated in the proof of subsequent Theorem 2.
If a missing provider p ∈ B∪M, then p’s credentials have already
been verified though a registration, withdrawal or prior commit-
ment process; hence, p’s PoP need not be verified again. Indeed, if
the missing provider p ∈ B, then they have zero confirmed funds,
and no further checks are required to secure these funds. Hence, the
contract first checks that a correct PoP has been provided for newly
missing providers, i.e.,V(pkp ,pkp ,σp, init) = 1 for p ∈ Mt −M−B.
Then, for all missing providersp with non-zero confirmed funds, i.e.,
p ∈ Mt −B, the contract requires Tp (κ) ⊇ Tp (κp ) (where Tp (κp ) is
provided by the operator as part of missing provider information)
and the operator’s provided Merkle proof of Tp (κ) should be valid.
For newly missing providers p ∈ Mt −M−B, the contract requires
that the Merkle proof of Tp (Kt (−1))(= Tp (κp )) be valid. For each
missing provider p who was also missing from the last round, i.e.,
p ∈ M∩(Mt −B), the contract requires thatH (Tp (κp )), i.e. the hash
of the provided Tp (κp ), equal p’s hash in L, Lp . For each provider
p whose signature was not present in the last commitment Kt (−1)
but is included in the current one (i.e., p < Mt ∪Xt ∪B and p ∈ M),
the operator must provide the set of transactions Tp (κp ) that satisfy
H (Tp (κp )) = Lp .
Theorem 2. If the contract accepts a commitment for block κ,
then (i) each registered provider is included exactly once in either
apkactive,Mt orXt ; and (ii)apkactive,Mt andXt have no unregistered
credentials.
Corollary 1. Suppose p is a registered provider whose signature
is not included in arsκ of a submitted commitment for block κ. Then,
if the commitment is accepted, pkp was detected as a missing provider.
Through these checks, the contract can assess whether all regis-
tered providers have been accounted for in the provided commit-
ment despite no explicit long-term record of their public keys.
If these conditions are met, the contract accepts the commitment
and sets apk = apkactive∗
∏
p∈Mt p, removing exited providers from
the aggregate public keyapk . It then updatesM,N,L. For previously
missing providers who are no longer missing, their confirmed funds
tracked in N are released. That is, for each p ∈ M < Mt , if κp
was notarized x blocks ago, then Nt (−x)pkc is updated to deduct
µ(T ′) from each c = s(T ′) from which p was assigned funds, ∀
T ′ ∈ Tp (κp ) (provided by the operator). Further, p is removed from
M (since p is no longer missing) and its corresponding hash from
L. All existing subsets of M and N are then shifted back by one;
e.g., M(−1) → M(−2) and Nt (−1) → N(−2). Any newly missing
provider p ∈ Mt < M is added toM(−1), its leaf in the submitted
commitment Lp (M(κ)) is added to L, and Nt (−1) is updated as
well to include p’s confirmed balance in the funds it tracks against
its source consumers in Nt (−1). The contract also clears the list of
recently exited providers X and removes any public keys in B that
are not present inMt . Prior block commitments are cleared, i.e., the
submitted κ becomes Kt (−1) and is the only commitment stored.
This process ensures that the contract correctly detects and
removes only registered providers from apk who have recently
exited, despite not storing individual providers’ public keys (and
thereby saving on expensive storage costs).
Theorem 3. PayPlace ensures Provider and Operator Safety.
By design of the commitment verification and withdrawal mod-
ules, we ensure that providers, consumers and operators following
PayPlace can access their confirmed funds. Further, by storing the
hash of the last transaction set that missing providers signed for
along with the design of the withdrawal function, PayPlace ensures
that missing providers can always access their confirmed funds:
Theorem 4. PayPlace ensures Data Availability.
The provider’s loss from operator malfeasance is capped by the
additional payments that she was due to receive in a given window
ta (i.e. new income that has not yet been accounted for in a notarized
block κ with p’s signature included in arsκ ).
Lemma 5. PayPlace provides Income Certainty.
Blocks may continue to be committed with new confirmed funds
to signing providers even if some providers do not sign, provided the
operator correctly generates the block. No payments to a provider
who follows the PayPlace protocol, once confirmed in a published
block that contains the provider’s signature, can be revoked.
5.2 Comparison of Marketplace Models
Table 1 summarizes the properties satisfied by existing off-chain
payment solutions vs. PayPlace. The operator may use payment
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channel constructions (e.g., Plasma Debit [17]) as a forwarding
intermediary between consumers and providers (see Section 3.1).
However, this violates Liveness; a withdrawal initiated by the oper-
ator must wait to allow the provider sharing the pairwise channel
to check if these funds are already promised to him. It also violates
Provider Safety: a malicious withdrawal may be successful if the
provider is not active to contest it. The operator must also provide
its own liquidity for making payments to providers since the oper-
ator’s channels with the provider and consumer are independent.
The operator may use Plasma-style sidechains like MoreVP [13]
to facilitate consumer-operator-provider payment flows where the
operator can simply use funds accrued in the sidechain from off-
chain consumer payments to pay the appropriate providers (see
Section 3.2), ensuring Liquidity Pooling. However, this has multiple
drawbacks. First, since balances are tracked based on the Unspent
Transaction Output model (UTXO [32]), operators may insert “out
of nowhere” fake transactions in the Plasma block where they as-
sign non-existent UTXOs to themselves. Thus both Consumer and
Provider Safety are violated; users can only protect their funds
if they are online to detect such transactions and withdraw their
funds in response. Further, the operator may entirely fail to share
convey the Plasma block (and its transactions) associated with a
commitment that it publishes to the contract, violating data avail-
ability. The marketplace on a ZK Rollup sidechain satisfies Safety
properties and ensures Data Availability (as does PayPlace) since
the zero-knowledge proof verified by the contract establishes the
validity of each included transaction while also revealing the state
transitions in users’ account balances.
6 Evaluation
We now estimate the costs involved in running PayPlace vs ZK
Rollup sidechains for facilitating an operator-mediated marketplace
if deployed on the Ethereum blockchain, as a case study. We focus
on the periodic on-chain notarizations (i.e. block commitments for
PayPlace and zkSNARK verifications for ZK Rollup) as withdrawals
and registration are likely far less frequent. We note that PayPlace
can be easily modified to store consumer balance information off-
chain, as discussed in Appendix E.
Since ZK Rollup sidechains are not in production yet, we con-
servatively estimate the costs involved. Groth16 is a popular zk-
SNARK technique and one of the cheapest to verify [26, 34, 38].
The SNARK prover’s (operator) computation is 4n +m group ex-
ponentiations, where n andm are the numbers of gates and wires.
We only consider group exponentiations and pairings for assessing
computation load as they dominate other operations [38]. Though
the number of constraints that the prover has to solve depends on
the implementation, we use recently published test results [10] and
estimate150K constraints. Very conservatively, we consider only
150K group exponentiations on the operator (instead of 4n +m).
Since 1600 transactions were packed in a SNARK in a recent bench-
mark [10] and 3000+ is hypothesized to be possible, we estimate
the number of payment transactions included in a SNARK as 3000.
For a Groth16 SNARK, the verifier (contract) performs 3 pairings.
To estimate the contract (SNARK verifier)’s gas costs, note that
as of the Istanbul update [11], a zkSNARK verification is estimated
to cost 200K gas. Transactions further have to be published on the
root chain at least in CALLDATA to ensure data availability [15].
CALLDATA is then a recurring cost of 16 gas per byte and 15 byte
transactions as of Istanbul [11]. We add an overhead of 50K gas
to account for additional costs, e.g., due to logging, storage slot
modifications, etc. as done previously [15]. Finally, Ethereum only
allows transactions up to 10M gas per block. Since the SNARK
allows 3000 transactions at best, ZK Rollups will not hit this limit.
For PayPlace, we consider worst-case costs. When the operator
aggregates signatures sent by providers for a block’s notarization,
it can perform one verification on the aggregated signature (against
the aggregated public keys of the providers) to check if all providers
have correctly signed it. However, if a provider returns a malformed
signature of a commitment to the operator, the operator may have
to verify every single signature to identify the malformed one and
exclude it. We account for this worst-case computational load on the
operator of 2 pairings (i.e., one verification) for each provider who
returns a signature. The contract performs one verification for arsκ
if there are nomissing (non-signing) providers. If there arenmissing
providers, the contract additionally performs n+1 pairings to verify
missing providers’ PoP [28, 29], multiplication of n + 1 public keys
to verify that apkactive ∗
∏
p∈Mt pkp , and 2n Merkle proofs (2 per
missing provider). While native support for BLS12-381 curve opera-
tions (i.e. pre-compiles) is being planned in Ethereum [5, 8, 20], the
alt_bn128 curve is mainly used for zkSNARKs and BLS signatures.
We hence use gas costs charged by the alt_bn128 pre-compiled con-
tract offered in Ethereum [7] to estimate the cost for BLS signature
operations. Parings cost (34000∗numpairings)+45000 gas, the cost of
a key multiplication in G1 (used for the public key multiplications
in the commitment verification module) is 150, and the cost per kec-
cak256 hash (used by the commitment verification and withdrawal
functions) 42. Finally, Ethereum’s 10M block gas limit means that
at most approximately 245 missing providers can be tolerated in a
commitment; with more providers the cost of operations to be per-
formed by the contract to verify and store the commitment exceeds
the total block gas limit. In that case, the operator exits the ex-
cess missing providers and we account for the associated gas costs
(one Merkle proof per exit of a missing provider and 1000 gas for
any overhead). We omit the costs of adding to storage forM since
these are capped and non-repetitive sunk costs. Acquiring storage
space on the root chain to track 246 public keys (i.e.,M) would cost
246∗20K gas; however, subsequent updates to these 246 values (e.g.,
to replace one missing provider’s key with another) cost only 5000
gas [47]. We hence consider an additional expense of 5000 for each
missing provider in a commitment, assuming the worst-case sce-
nario where all entries ofM need to be updated. We further assume
the worst-case cost scenario where all providers who are missing
from a commitment are active in the next; this incurs an additional
hash function operation for each missing provider p from the pre-
vious commitment since the contract must verify H (Tp(κ)) = Lp
where Tp(κ) is provided by the operator. Finally, we add an extra
30K gas per notarization to cover any other overheads.
To enable flexible payment schemes as discussed in Section 1, we
consider operator-mediated marketplace transactions in this work
(i.e. consumers pay operators instantly at the time of order place-
ment while operators pay appropriate providers asynchronously
after order matching and fulfilment). With ZK Rollup, this results
in two transactions per order; consumer−→operator payment is a
11
transaction included in a zkSNARK as is the operator→provider
transaction. However, considering only one transaction per order
for ZK Rollup (e.g. consumer pays provider directly) exhibits similar
gas and computational costs as seen here (not shown). Figures 6a
and 6b, shown in log-log scale, depict the combined computational
load (on the operator and contract, in terms of the number of curve
pairings and exponentials evaluated) and gas costs respectively, for
the two protocols while varying the number of transactions (from
10K to 1M) as well as the % of providers who do not attest their. Un-
surprisingly, the computational load of PayPlace remains constant
in the number of transactions; even as the number of providers
failing to sign the commitment increases, the higher signature veri-
fications consequently being done by the contract (n+1) is offset by
the operator performing n fewer verifications. On the other hand,
ZK Rollup’s computational load is several orders of magnitude
higher than PayPlace’s. ZK Rollup’s gas as well as computational
cost increases with the number of transactions; PayPlace’s increases
significantly if providers are missing. Since missing providers are
forcefully exited if their count is too high to commit the root, the
cost is limited (the exit operation only involves a Merkle proof and
does not contribute significantly in log order to gas costs). However,
as the number of missing providers significantly increases, the gas
costs imposed by them may outweigh ZK Rollup’s cost (Figure 6c).
Hence, while ZK Rollup imposes significant computational costs
that PayPlace does not, the gas cost of ZK Rollup scales with the
number of transactions while that of PayPlace scales with the num-
ber of missing providers. Operators choosing between these solu-
tions must assess these two factors; when providers’ devices can
reasonably be expected to participate in the signing process (once
every day or hour, based on the configuration), PayPlace is highly
beneficial by scaling throughput at no marginal gas cost.
7 Discussion
We now discuss deployment-related aspects and limitations.
Configuring ta Since PayPlace payments are decomposed into
consumer→operator and operator→provider transactions, a shorter
interval ta indicates a lower counter-operator risk to providers in
receiving compensation for the consumer orders fulfilled during
the last ta . At the same time, notarizations are root-chain transac-
tions that impose monetary fees on the operator. The choice of ta
must reflect these considerations. Providers may even periodically
vote on ta ’s value to reflect their trust in the operator over time;
the fees charged by the operator (i.e., commissions on consumer’s
payments) can reflect the overhead of notarization costs every ta .
Configuring γ The time taken for generating a block’s Merkle
tree increases with the number of providers registered in the sys-
tem, since each provider has a leaf of transactions in the tree. Fur-
ther, the number of checks performed by a provider before signing
the Merkle tree’s root is directly proportional to the number of
providers as well as the number of consumers sourcing the provider
payments. Limiting γ without limiting the size of the marketplace
therefore requires horizontally scaling the PayPlace sidechain in a
manner this is transparent to consumers.
Consumer Withdrawals In PayPlace, consumer withdrawals
are prohibited to guarantee Provider and Operator Safety; otherwise,
the consumer may attempt to withdraw funds already promised via
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Figure 6: Mean and standard deviation (log scale) for Plasma Go and
ZK Rollup of (a) estimated computational and (b) gas cost with 10K
providers and varying number of transactions, and (c) estimated gas
costs with 100K transactions and varying number of providers.
off-chain transactions to the operator. To prevent this, the contract
would have to impose a challenge period on the withdrawal, during
which the operator (or providers) must be online to reveal the
off-chain transaction and block the attempted exit.
Unregistered Providers PayPlace does not prohibit operators
from including unregistered providers in a block; in fact, these
providers can initiate withdrawals against these funds as well. How-
ever, since the operator cannot include unregistered providers in the
commitment submitted for notarization (see Theorem 2), Provider
Safety and Data Availability is not guaranteed for them. Note that
registered providers and consumers are unaffected by the presence
of unregistered ones as long as they follow PayPlace.
Air-gapped Wallets In practice, it is highly desirable to store
private keys for blockchain addresses in air-gapped wallets to keep
the associated cryptocurrency holdings secure. Then, using the root
chain’s account keys for frequently signing PayPlace (if the curve
is BLS-friendly) commitments forces provides to forgo such secure
storage options. However, providers may simply generate separate
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credentials for use with PayPlace since PayPlace is designed to not
rely on account keys’ compatibility with BLS signing.
8 Conclusion
Highly scalable and low-cost payment solutions are crucial for
decentralized applications. In this work, we develop PayPlace, an
off-chain payment system optimized for marketplace-style transac-
tions. PayPlace utilizes pairwise payment channels for facilitating
consumer payments to the operator, while allowing the operator
to reference funds accrued in its payment channel with consumers
to in-turn make off-chain payments to providers. Our design in-
volves periodically committing summaries of off-chain transaction
activity to the root chain that is signed by all providers who are due
payments and whose fund withdrawals are processed in the root
chain against these signed commitments. At the same time, our
commitment verification and withdrawal mechanisms negate any
externalities that providers may have on one another by ensuring
that they can continue to receive additional payments from the
operator (as marketplace orders continue to be placed and fulfilled)
even if certain providers are unavailable to sign these commitments.
We show that PayPlace is orders of magnitude cheaper in computa-
tional and blockchain execution costs than the state-of-the-art ZK
Rollup if most providers are periodically available to sign generated
block commitments.
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Symbol Meaning
ω Operator
pkω Public key of the operator
c Consumer
pkc Public key of consumer c
Dc,t Total funds deposited by consumer c by time t
T Off-chain payment transaction from consumer to operator
s(T ) Sender of the transaction
µ(T ) c specified in a transaction
µ∗c,t Total balance owned by the operator as of time t in their channel with the consumer c
w∗c,t Total funds withdrawn (by the operator and providers) against the operator’s channel with c as of time t
Ct Set containing the last operator-verified transaction from each consumer as of time t
p Provider
ta Time-interval between payment consolidation and forwarding operations executed by the operator
T ′ Payment promise from the operator to a provider
µ(T ′) Payment amount µ specified by the operator in T ′
s(T ′) Public key of the consumer whose payment channel is referred to in T ′
Tp
Set of payment-promise transactions, specifying c owed to p against specific consumers’ payment channel with the
operator
Tω Issued payment promises where the operator is the recipient
κ Block generated from a set of payment-promise transactions
Tp (κ) Transactions for provider p included in κ
T(κ) Ordered set of transactions (i.e. Tp (κ) ∀p included in κ
M(κ) Merkle tree generated from T(κ)
Lp (M(κ)) Leaf in the treeM(κ) corresponding to the hash of Tp (κ)
R(M(κ)) Root of the Merkle treeM(κ)
Pp (M(κ)) Merkle proof of inclusion for Tp (M(κ))
T′p (κ) Accessible funds that p has in a notarized κ
Kt Set of notarized blocks κ corresponding to confirmed as of time t ordered by the times they were accepted
Kt (−1) The latest accepted block
κp The last notarized block whose commitment included p’s signature
Tp (κp ) Transactions for provider p included in κp
Table 2: Summary of Notation
Appendices
A Summary of PayPlace Notation
A summary of the notation used in the PayPlace system model is
provided in Table 2.
B Numerical Example of the PayPlace Model
To illustrate the consumer and provider transaction models in Pay-
Place, consider t = t1, . . . , t8. Consumers c1 and c2 deposit 30c and
20c respectively into the PayPlace smart-contract at time t1. Sup-
pose c1 additionally deposits another 40c at t3. Then, Dc1,t = 30
∀t ∈ [t1, t3) and = 70 ∀t ∈ [t3, t8], and Dc2,t = 20 ∀t ∈ [t1, t8].
To send 10c to the operator at t4, c1 generates a transaction Ta =
(10,pkω ,pkc1 ) and signature σTa = S(Ta , skc1 ); then µ∗c1,t4 = 10.
Suppose c2 similarly sends 10c to the operator at t4 via trans-
action Tb . To send another 10c at t5, c1 generates a transaction
Tc = (20,pkω ,pkc1 ) and the corresponding σTc ; then µ∗c1,t5 = 20.
At t5 then, the latest transactions Ct5 = {Tb ,Tc } and the remaining
funds available for consumers c1 and c2 to use at t5 is fc1,t5 = 50
and fc2,t5 = 10 respectively. Suppose two registered providers
p1 and p2 participate in the system, with no operator fees, and
the orders for Ta and Tb are fulfilled by p1 while Tc is fulfilled
by p2. At t8, the operator generates the block κ = (T,M), where
T(κ) = {{(10,pkp1 ,pkc1 ), (10,pkp1 ,pkc2 )}, {(10,pkp2 ,pkc1 )}} (with
Tω (κ) = ∅ since the operator did not deduct any fees in this
case). We then have Tp1 (κ) = {{(10,pkp1 ,pkc1 ), (10,pkp1 ,pkc2 )},
Tp2 (κ) = {(10,pkp2 ,pkc1 )}, and Tω (κ) = ∅. Further, the Merkle tree
M(κ) = H (H (Tp1 (κ)),H (Tp2 (κ)),H (Tω (κ))), where H is the one-
way irreversible hash function used for generating the Merkle tree
and the leaves ofM are Lp (M) = H (Tp (κ)), p = p1,p2,ω. Suppose
pkp1 withdraws their specified funds at t10. Further, suppose the
operator generates another block at t16 and neither pkp1 nor pkp2
fulfil any additional consumer orders from t8 to t16. Then the gener-
ated block at t16 is κ ′ = (T′,M ′), where T(κ ′) = {(10,pkp2 ,pkc1 )}}
(with Tω (κ) and Tp1 (κ) as ∅).
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C Rogue Key Attack in BLS Signature
Aggregation
Consider a set of n keys K = {(ski ,pki ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} whose
public keys and signatures are to be aggregated via BLS. An at-
tacker who knows the public keys in K can choose some β ∈
Zq where q is of prime order and compute a false public key
pkatt = д
β
1 ∗ (
∏n
u=1 pku )−1 where д1 is a generator for group G1
of prime order q. The aggregate public key computed by a ver-
ifier is pka = pkatt ∗ ∏nu=1 pku . The attacker can then declare
the signature σa,m = H0(m)β (where H0 is a random oracle map-
ping into G0 which is also of prime order q) and convince the
verifier that this has been signed by all n ski ’s as well as pkatt’s
skatt. To see this, note that verification of σa,m requires check-
ing if e(д1,σa,m ) = e(pkatt ∗∏nu=1 pku ,H0(m)) where e is a pre-
specified non-degenerate bilinear function (e : G0 ×G1 −→ GT ). But
e(д1,σa,m ) = e(д1,H0(m)β ) as declared by the attacker to the veri-
fier, and e(д1,H0(m)β ) = e(дβ1 ,H0(m)), and д
β
1 = pkatt ∗
∏n
u=1 pku
by definition of pkatt.
D Proofs
We provide proofs associated with the results in Section 5.
D.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof Sketch. Let p’s public and private keys on the root chain
(i.e. account keys that are used for signing blockchain transactions)
be denoted by pk ′p and sk ′p respectively. Consider (pk ′p , sk ′p ) =
(pkp , skp ), i.e. the root chain supports BLS account keys which can
also be used with PayPlace. By design of the underlying blockchain,
miners process transactions only if the transaction is signed by the
stated sender, in this case, pkp ; hence registering a provider im-
plicitly provides Proof of Possession (PoP) to the blockchain. How-
ever, this can be attacked with an oracle [42] OMSign(pki ,msд)
that returns msд signed by ski . In that case, the attacker with
a maliciously computed pkatt = д
β
1 ∗ (
∏n
i=1 pki ) may provide
a signed transaction on the root chain by computing σm,att =
H0(m)β /∏ni=1OMSign(pki ,m) where m is the transaction to be
submitted to the blockchain calling the contract’s registration func-
tion and registering pkatt as a vendor, i iterates over the registered
providers, and some β ∈ Zq . In PayPlace, however, this requires
that all registered providers (even honest ones) sign this transac-
tion asking for pkatt’s enrolment, which they have no reason or
incentive to do.
Consider the other case where (pk ′p , sk ′p ) , (pkp , skp ). By design
of the underlying blockchain, miners process transactions only if
the transaction is signed by the stated sender, in this case,pk ′p ; hence
registering a provider implicitly provides Proof of Possession (PoP)
to the blockchain. It then suffices to show that pk ′p ’s owner also
owns pkp . First, we note that the provided PoP σp,BLS establishes
that pkp is not a rogue public key. Even if OMSign is available,
employing separate hash functions for signing POP messages and
other messages [42] guarantees resilience of the provided PoP to
the rogue public-key attack. Second, since a provider p generates
this PoP by signing the combined hash of their root account public
key pk ′p and BLS key pkp , ifV(pkp ,H (pkp ,pk ′p ),σp,BLS ) = 1, then
pkp ’s owner is the owner of pk ′p .
Finally, note that the contract rejects the registration unless σω,p
was generated after the latest freeze period. Hence, σω,p provided
by the operator to p for registration is only valid until the next
freeze window begins. Ifp registers successfully withσω,p , it cannot
register again (with σω,p ) even in the current open window since
pkp is added to B. □
D.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof Sketch. Note that funds assigned to be Tp are of the
form shown in Figure 2; for each consumer whose order p fulfiled, it
specifies a payment amount in c to be sourced from that consumer’s
funds that have been deposited into the smart-contract (i.e. the
consumer’s unidirectional channel with the operator). Without
loss of generality, assume that p has funds assigned from exactly
one consumer c in Tp ; let the transaction corresponding to this in
Tp be T ′. Recall that the set of providers that each have a leaf in
M(κ) is denoted by P(κ). Let P(κ)−p = P(κ) \ p. Then it suffices to
show that: (1) at time t the contract has at least µ(T ′) c available
as c’s deposited funds Dc,t , and (2) that the total funds that can be
withdrawn by P(κ)−p cannot exceed Dc,t − µ(T ′).
To prove (1), let t ′ < t be the time thatp signedκ. Then, by defini-
tion of PayPlace, µ(T ) ≤ Dc,t ′ and∑v ∈P(κ)∑T ′′∈Tv (κ) 1s(T ′′)=c µ(T ′′) ≤
µ(T ) − w∗c,t , implying µ(T ′) ≤ µ(T ) ≤ Dc,t . Note that Dc,t is
a weakly monotonically increasing function of t since consumer
withdrawals are prohibited in PayPlace; hence (1) holds.
To prove (2), let µ−p be the total funds assigned to P(κ)−p with
c as the source consumer. By definition, when p signed κ at t ′, the
following held: µ−p + µ(T ′) ≤ µ(T ) ≤ Dc,t ′ . Subtracting µ(T ′) from
this, we get µ−p ≤ µ(T ) − µ(T ′) ≤ Dc,t − µ(T ′). However, this
is contradictory if µ−p > Dc,t ′ − µ(T ′). Since Dc,t monotonically
increases with t as well (weakly), this proves (2). □
D.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof Sketch. Let Pc (κ) denote providers who have been as-
signed payment transactions in κ that have c specified as the con-
sumer source. Let t ′ < t denote the time when κ was signed, and let
T be the source transaction from c to the operator, assigning funds
to the operator in their unidirectional payment channel, revealed
by the operator via C′t . It suffices to show that for a consumer c , if
all providers in Pc (κ) follow the PayPlace protocol when signing κ’s
commitment, then c is assured of Consumer Safety. c’s confirmed
funds at t ′ is denoted by fc,t ′ = Dc,t ′ − µ∗c,t . Consumer safety is
violated if providers Pc (κ) can cumulatively withdraw a value of c
over Dc,t ′ − µ∗c,t ′ against c’s funds at any time t > t ′. We show that
providers can cumulatively withdraw no more than µ(T ) ≤ µ∗c,t ′ at
any time t > t ′, thereby guaranteeing Consumer Safety. The total
value of funds that Pc (κ) can access with c as the source consumer
is:
∑
v ∈Pc (κ)
∑
T ′∈Tv (κ) 1s(T ′)=c µ(T ′); we denote this by µcp . By def-
inition, since providers in Pc (κ) followed PayPlace when signing κ,
we have µcp ≤ µ(T ) ≤ Dc,t ′ . Subtracting µ(T ) from the inequality
yields µcp−µ(T ) ≤ µ(T )−µ(T )∗ ≤ Dc,t ′−µ(T )which is contradicted
if µcp > Dc,t ′ − µ(T ). Hence c’s confirmed funds are safe at t ′. For
any t > t ′, note that Dc,t ≥ Dc,t ′ since consumer withdrawals of
deposited funds are prohibited, and µ(T ) is always ≤ µc,t . □
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D.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof Sketch. A consumer’s confirmed funds fc,t at time t is
Dc,t − µ∗c,t ; hence the cumulative funds withdrawn by providers or
the operator against c’s deposit should not exceed µ∗c,t at any time t .
In other words, ifw∗c,t denotes the total funds withdrawn against c’s
deposit as of time t , then we need to showw∗c,t ≤ µ∗c,t . As described
in the withdrawal module,w∗c,t is tracked and updated by the con-
tract every time a withdrawal against c’s funds is made successfully.
As specified, the maximum c transferred upon a successful with-
drawal by provider p is min{µ ′c,t −
∑x−1
i=ηt N(−i)pkc −w∗c,t , µ(T ′)}.
Let wp denote this value. Even if no missing providers exist (i.e.
N = ∅), a maximum of onlywp = µ ′c,t −w∗c,t is transferred to the
provider;w∗c,t+1 is then updated tow
∗
c,t +wp = µ
′
c,t and µ ′c,t ≤ µ∗c,t
by definition. Sincew∗c,t+1 = µ
′
c,t , subsequent withdrawals will not
transfer any funds out of c . □
D.5 Proof of Lemma 4
A withdrawal initiated by any provider or the operator in PayPlace
results immediately in either a cancellation (during a freeze window
or invalid inputs) or a transfer of funds to the caller’s address.
Hence PayPlace satisfies Liveness. As illustrated from Figure 2, and
described in the withdrawal module, a provider p’s exit is fulfilled
by funds sourced from the deposits of consumers who paid the
operator for services later fulfilled by p. The operator does not
deposit their own funds to pay providers. Hence PayPlace provides
Liquidity Pooling.
D.6 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof Sketch. For ease of explanation, we set Xt = ∅ in the
provided commitment (the proof trivially extends to the case where
|Xt | > 0). Then, the contract requires apkactive ∗
∏
p∈Mt = apk
to accept the commitment. First note that registration of a rogue
public key is not possible here, as shown in Lemma 1; hence the
typical rogue public key attack on BLS signature aggregation is
infeasible here.
We first show that inserting unregistered credentials in apk or
Mt will cause the commitment to be rejected. Consider that the op-
erator generates an unregistered key-pair (pkatt, skatt) and includes
σatt,κ in generating arsκ (or may simply set arsκ = σatt,κ ). Let
A′t ⊆ At be the subset of active signing providers whose signature
the operator includes in arsκ along with σatt,κ . The correspond-
ing aggregate public key that will then verify arsκ successfully
is pkatt ∗ ∏p∈A′t pkp . Hence, the operators provides apkactive =
pkatt ∗ ∏p∈A′t pkp to the contract. To satisfy the contract’s re-
quirement, the operator generates pkmissing = apk ∗ (apkactive)−1
and sets Mt = {pkmissing}. This ensures that contract’s check
apkactive∗
∏
p∈Mt = apk passes; however, note that the contract also
requires proofs of possession σp, init from each p ∈ Mt . To generate
σmissing, init requires computing the secret key skmissing given the
public key pkmissing (which requires violating the Diffie-Hellman
assumption), while it can be trivially provided for legitimately miss-
ing providers who relayed their σp, init at the beginning to acquire
σω,p for registration. Even if the operator includes legitimately
missing providers in Mt , the presence of a POP-less pkmissing in
Mt is imminent, which renders the attack unsuccessful. Finally,
consider that the operator generates arsκ =
∏
p∈At σp,κ and the
corresponding apkactive =
∏
p∈At p correctly. It is straightforward
to see that inserting unregistered key pkatt in a correctly generated
Mt will cause the commitment to be rejected since. If the operator
insert pkatt in M′t such that apkactive ∗
∏
p∈M′t = apk , then the
require PoP check for pkatt will fail as such a pkatt is a rogue public
key.
Note that if the operator omits a registered provider fromapkactive
orMt , then apkactive ∗
∏
p∈Mt , apk . To omit a registered provider
while also ensuring apkactive ∗
∏
p∈Mt = apk , the operator would
have to engage in the rogue public key attack described above and
insert an unregistered public key in the commitment. As we’ve
shown above, such a commitment fails to be accepted. □
D.7 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof Sketch. Since the operator is subject to the same rules
as a provider for the commitment verification and withdrawal pro-
cesses (i.e., committed blocks must contain a leaf specifying the
operator’s funds like commission charged as well as the operator’s
signature on the block), Provider Safety implies Operator Safety.
To show Provider Safety, we show that a provider following the
PayPlace protocol when signing commitments is guaranteed of
safety of her confirmed funds.
• Case 1: Suppose p, following PayPlace, signs a block κ’s
commitment andκ’s notarization is published to the contract
with σp,κ included in arsκ . Then p’s funds are safe as long as
Kt (−1) = κ, i.e. p’s funds are fully available for withdrawal
exactly once in κ as long as κ is the latest commitment.
• Case 2: Suppose p’s signature is not included in the commit-
ment of a block κ ′ and κ ′ is published to the contract (i.e.
Kt (−1) = κ ′ at some time t ). Let x represent the last block
κp that p signed, i.e. Kt (−x) = κp . Then funds assigned to
p in κp (Tp (κp )) are available for withdrawal by p at t even
against the latest commitmentKt (−1), i.e., p’s funds are fully
available for withdrawal exactly once in κ.
Case 1: Theorem 1 shows that p’s funds in κ are safe as long
as providers and the operator can only withdraw funds that have
been assigned in κ and can perform the withdrawal only once. To
show Case 1 then, it suffices to show that, (1) as long as κ is the
active commitment,i.e. Kt (−1) = κ, then a withdrawal initiated by
any provider p′ (or operator) corresponds to funds accounted for
p′ in κ, and (2) p′ can initiate a successful withdrawal of funds in
Tp′(Kt (−1)) only once. For (1) note that the withdrawal module,
by design of PayPlace, requires a Merkle proof of funds Tp (Kt (−1))
that the provider is attempting to exit for all providers (registered
or not) except those in M. Further, note that if p ∈ M, then the
contract restricts their withdrawal to funds in Tp where H (Tp ) =
Lp . From the design of the commitment verification module, we
see that whenever a new commitment for a block κ is submitted for
notarization, the contract requires a valid Merkle proof Pp (M(κ))
of funds assigned to p in κ if the operator includes p in the missing
providers’ listMt . Further, if p signed the previous commitment,
i.e. p ∈ Mt −M, then p is a newly missing provider and the entry
added for p in L corresponds to the transactions in the Merkle
proof, i.e. Lp = Tp (κ). If p missed the previous commitment as well,
i.e. p ∈ M, then the contract additionally requires the funds for p
shown in the Merkle proof is atleast equivalent to the transactions
17
stored Lp , i.e. Tp (κ) ⊇ Tp whereH (Tp ) = Lp . Hence, a withdrawal
initiated by any provider p′ (or operator), whether in M or not,
corresponds to funds that have been accounted for in Kt (−1).
To see (2), note that after a successful withdrawal, each provider
is added to X or B, depending on whether they indicated that their
withdrawal as a permanent exit from the sidechain (i.e. they will
not be signing any future commitments); the withdrawal function
by design cancels a withdrawal from p if p ∈ X ∪ B.
Case 2: From Theorem 2, we know that any registered provider
whose signature is missing in a submitted commitment is detected
as missing by the contract, and added to M; further, the hash of
Tp (κp ) in L and the funds in Tp (κp ) is recorded in N against each
source consumer. Hence, (1) p is appropriately added toM, L and
N. Further, by design of the withdrawal and commitment verifi-
cation modules, note that p is not removed from M or L nor its
funds assigned in Tp (κp ) removed from N’s until p withdraws
Tp (κp ) or signs a new commitment. Next, (2) no provider who
has signed a commitment that was subsequently published after
κp can withdraw funds locked by N corresponding to providers
whose last signature was on κp or even an earlier commitment;
the maximum allowed withdrawal for a provider p ensures this:
min(µ ′c,t −
∑x−1
i=ηt N(−i)pkc − w∗c,t , µ(T ′)) for each T ′ ∈ Tp with
c = s(T ′), where ηt denotes the largest number of consecutive
signatures missed by a provider currently tracked inM at time t .
Finally, (3) at the time t that p signs a commitment κ as per Pay-
Place, note that all entries in N for funds owed to providers whose
signatures are not included in arsκ have already been incorporated
in κ. The commitment verification module requires Merkle proofs
showing that each missing provider who was missing earlier as well
(i.e. already present inM) is allocated funds Tp (κ) in the submitted
commitment that is atleast equivalent to funds corresponding to
Lp . Further a newly missing provider (i.e. p < M and p ∈ Mt ), the
contract requires Merkle proofs showing that funds Tp (κ) assigned
to them in the commitment is atleast equivalent to Tp (Kt (−1) and
only accounts for these funds inNt . Finally, the withdrawal module
ensures that if a provider p ∈ M withdraws their funds, they are
removed from M and L, and N is updated to deduct the funds in
Tp (κp ) (i.e. the funds they just withdrew) against each source con-
sumer specified. Hence, since withdrawals of all possible providers
are against funds that have been specified in the commitment of κ,
and neither missing nor active providers can withdraw their con-
firmed funds more than once against a commitment, this reduces
to Case 1, and p’s funds are safe and available for withdrawing.
□
D.8 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof Sketch. The PayPlace contract only stores the last ac-
cepted block’s commitment Kt (−1) and associated data at any time
t . Note that the contract retains the public keys of missing provider
in an accepted commitment asM = Mt − B, where B represents
the list of providers who are inMt but do not have accessible funds
in the sidechain. These are providers whose signatures have not
been included in any commitments since they registered or since
they last withdrew funds (but did not declare their withdrawal as a
permanent exit from the sidechain). Consider, for an accepted block
κ, that a provider p generated σp,κ and the operator included this
in the arsκ provided to the contract. This implies that the p was
revealed T(κ) and M(κ), hence they can construct Pp (M(κ)) to
withdraw Tp (κ). Since the definition of confirmed funds is the funds
assigned to p in the last notarized block p signed, p’s accessible
funds T′p (Kt (−1)) correspond to confirmed funds in this case.
Next, consider that σp,κ is not included in arsκ ; i.e. either p was
not revealed κ, p’s validation checks on κ failed, or p did generate
and send σp,κ to the operator, but the operator failed to include
it in arsκ . Note that the contract rejects such a κ’s commitments
if any registered provider p’s signature is excluded from arsκ un-
less p is included inMt , seen from Theorem 2. In the other cases
though, as long as the operator includes p inMt , the commitment
is accepted. If p ∈ Mt ∩ B, no published commitment (including κ)
has contained their signature since their last withdrawal or since
their registration; hence they have 0 funds accessible as of κ. If
p < B ∪M, i.e. their signature was included in the previous com-
mitment, the contract stores H (Tp (Kt (−1)) as Lp , by definition of
the commitment verification module. Since p has signed Kt (−1),
they are guaranteed to have been revealed Tp (Kt (−1)) in order
to access Lp for withdrawal. Finally, note that if p ∈ Mt ∩M, i.e.
p’s signature was not included in the previous commitment either,
their confirmed funds is that included in the last accepted block
that they had signed for n commitments earlier (for some n); i.e.
their confirmed funds in this block continues to be T′p (Kt (−1)) =
T′p (Kt (−2)) = T′p (Kt (−3)) = · · · = Tp (Kt (−n)) = Tp (κp ). They
can continue to access this by providing Tp (Kt (−n)) (i.e. Tp (κp ))
to the withdrawal function which they are guaranteed to have been
revealed since they signed the block. □
E Optimizing for Storage in PayPlace
PayPlace can be easily modified to move the bulk of its state (con-
sumer information) off-chain. The PayPlace smart-contract stores
the public keypkc of each consumer c alongwith their net deposited
fundsDc,t on the contract at any time t , the highest operator-owned
balance in their channel revealed to the contract as of time t , µ ′c,t ;
and the total fundsw∗c,t withdrawn by providers and the operator
from this channel. Clearly, the required storage is O(n) in the num-
ber of registered consumers (and O(1) in the number of registered
providers). If storage is significantly more expensive than compute
on the underlying DLT, we can optimize for storage at higher com-
putational cost. Similar to the storage mechanism proposed in ZK
Rollup [15], the contract can track just two Merkle roots instead of
individual consumer data: one of a Merkle tree A of registered con-
sumers’ public keys pkc ; and the other of a Merkle tree B of tuples
(Dc,t , µ ′c,t ,w∗c,t ), such that pkc that is stored in the n-th leaf of A
corresponds to (Dc,t , µ ′c,t ,w∗c,t ) in the n-th leaf of B. Consumer reg-
istrations can use the same process as ZK Rollup [15]; however, note
that these functions are now more compute-intensive since each
requires the contract to verify Merkle proofs. Similarly, provider
and operator withdrawals require computation to verify the Merkle
proofs for the consumer’s balance in B against which they attempt
withdrawal. However, all changes to B can be broadcast to others
(stored in blockchain’s logs), hence all providers and operators can
compute the leaves and Merkle proofs in B for any consumer, even
if they have been offline.
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